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From Watergate to Ken Starr: Potter




In just seven law review pages, Potter Stewart's classic "Or of the
Press" essay provokes a lot of thought. Writing in 1974,1 mere months
after the Watergate impeachment proceedings and the resignation of
President Richard Nixon, Justice Stewart makes two related assertions:
(1) that the so-called Press Clause2 of the First Amendment was
designed to serve a government-checking function, by facilitating
systematic scrutiny and criticism of the three branches of government to
uncover and prevent abuse of government power; and (2) that because
of this checking function, the Press Clause ought to be understood as a
"structural" provision of the Constitution that gives the "organized
press-the daily newspapers and other established news media-" some
rights that the rest of us do not necessarily enjoy under the Speech
Clause3 of the First Amendment.
Much has happened in the realm of the First Amendment, as well
as in constitutional law and politics more generally, in the 25 years since
Justice Stewart wrote "Or of the Press." Today seems a particularly
fitting time to take a close second look at Justice Stewart's ideas, given
the recently-concluded impeachment affair that sparked so many
people to draw parallels to and distinctions from the Watergate affair
that inspired Stewart's reflections. And so, with memories of Bill
Clinton, Ken Starr and Monica Lewinsky still quite fresh, I shall try in
the next few paragraphs to sketch my own (admittedly tentative)
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. The essay was written and delivered in the Fall of 1974. See Potter Stewart, "Or of the
Press," Address at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974), in 26
HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1975).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom... of
the press .... ").
3. U.S. CONSr. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech....").
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thoughts on the two big points Justice Stewart advanced a quarter
century ago.
Constitutional developments of recent decades have borne out the
correctness and centrality of Justice Stewart's first big point-that
criticism of government is fully protected expression that lies at the
heart of the First Amendment. Of course, the notion that the First
Amendment was designed to promote speech in order to check
government abuse had been suggested even before 1974 and had often
been thought to be an unstated but powerful explanation for many
Court holdings, but lately the Court has been quite explicit. For
example, in Texas v. Johnson,4 Justice Brennan writing for the Court
affirmed his remarks in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan5 a quarter
century earlier that "[ilt is as much [a citizen's] duty to criticize as it is
the official's duty to administer. As Madison said, 'the censorial power
is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over
the people.' 6 He then applied this teaching to Gregory Johnson's
expressive (though perhaps distasteful) conduct by remarking:
"Johnson was not, we add, prosecuted for the expression of just any
idea; he was prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with the
policies of this country, expression situated at the core of our First
Amendment values."'7
In his essay, Justice Stewart speculates that our Republic might
have been able to survive even without the checking function facilitated
by the First Amendment.8 I am not so sure. In any event, I-like
Justice Stewart-am very thankful the Founders built into the
Constitution the structural protection for government scrutiny and
criticism. Indeed, I would have placed more faith in the safeguards the
Founders set up than we have in recent years. Had we truly understood
the power of the checking function Justice Stewart describes, we would
have relied on the system in place that led to a satisfactory resolution of
Watergate-a strong First Amendment coupled with Congressional
oversight and impeachment authority-instead of enacting the
monstrous Independent Counsel Act that has haunted us for over a
decade.9 In fact, those of us who favor letting the Act die this Summer
4. 491 U.S. 397,408-10 (1989)(prohibiting Texas from punishing flag burning).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
7. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411. See also RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(invoking many examples of citizen criticism of government officials as epitome of core First
Amendment-protected activity); id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Speech
about public officials or matters of public concern receives greater protection than speech
about other topics.").
8. Stewart, supra note 1, at 636.
9. For a discussion of some of the incentive problems created by the Act, to say nothing
of the flaws Justice Scalia powerfully pointed out in his dissent in Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S.
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do so in large part because we trust that the checking function protected
by the First Amendment will enable Congress to police Presidential
abuse such that the costs (of all kinds) of an Independent Counsel are
simply unnecessary to bear.10
Potter Stewart's identification of the checking function is thus a
deep constitutional insight. If Justice Stewart is to be faulted-and this
brings me to Stewart's second main assertion-it is for not extending his
insight far enough. Justice Stewart identifies the "structural" checking
function underlying the Press Clause, but sees no such function
underlying the Speech Clause under which the rest of the world lives.
Thus, for Stewart, the "organized press" has special First Amendment
rights the rest of us do not enjoy.
Let me explain briefly why I am disinclined to follow Justice
Stewart here.1' To begin with, I see the checking function as animating
the Speech Clause as well as the Press Clause, so that the Press is
entitled to no "special" protection. As Professor Anderson put it in the
best historical work on the Press Clause,
That the press clause has a distinct history does not mean, of
course, that it must be given a meaning different from the speech
clause today, or even that it had a different meaning in 1791. It is
654, 697 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting), see Vikram David Amar, Some Questions and Answers
Concerning Justice Blaclnun's Federalism and Separation of Powers Cases, 26 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 153 (1998), and Vikram David Amar, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing
but the Truth about 'High Crimes and Misdemeanors' and the Constitution's Impeachment
Process, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 403 (1999).
10. Those persons who favor renewal of the Act do so in part because they do not trust in
the First Amendment. For example, Ken Gormley, a proponent of a revised Independent
Counsel Act, thinks that the events that led to the resignation of President Nixon were
fortuitous-that if more important college football games were played the day of the infamous
"Saturday Night Massacre," the public would not have been as engaged and enraged, and
history could have taken a different turn. See Dialogue Between Akhil Reed Amar and Ken
Gormley, Should We Ditch the Independent Prosecutor Law?, SLATE (Feb. 16, 1999)
<httplwww.slate.com/dialoguesI99-O2-17/dialogues.asp?iMsg=2>. See generally KEN
GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD Cox: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1997)(depicting the events
surrounding the Saturday Night Massacre). I think that while the timing of particular events
in the downfall of President Nixon were fortuitous, the ultimate outcome was dictated by
irresistible forces-including the awesome power of the free political expression-once the
scandal was uncovered.
11. I note that the Court has thus far failed to afford the Press any special First
Amendment protection since Justice Stewart wrote. Justice Brennan in Dun & Bradstree
Ina v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 783-84 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
observed that six members of the Court in that case "agree today that, in the context of
defamation law, the [First Amendment] rights of the institutional media are no greater and
no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same
activities." Thus, Justice Stewart's statement in 1974 that "the Court has never suggested that
the constitutional right of free speech gives an individual [unconnected to the Press] any




possible that checking government power was also the purpose of
the speech clause.'
2
In this regard, I do not really agree with Justice Stewart that a
problematic "constitutional redundancy" would result unless the Press
Clause were interpreted to mean something different than the Speech
Clause.13 The First Amendment's enumeration of rights of speech and
press could easily be understood to ensure that all manners of political
expression be protected for "structural" reasons.14 Indeed, the only
state constitution that contained provisions for both freedom of speech
and freedom of the press prior to enactment of the federal Bill of Rights
made clear that the two provisions were employed for the same end.15
So for these reasons, I don't see the difference between the Press
and Speech clauses that Justice Stewart saw. I reject his argument for
special press protection for another reason as well-how could anyone
(including the Founders) have ever given a coherent and principled
definition of "the Press" itself?16 Justice Stewart offers one definition-
"the daily newspapers and other established news media"17-but his
definition is immediately problematic. Would pamphleteers in 1787
qualify under his definition? Even if they would, surely radio and TV
stations would not, given that they were not "established news media"
in the eighteenth century. And yet Justice Stewart, later in his essay,
includes electronic media within the zone of his protection-as well he
must, given TV's role in the Watergate episode on which Justice
Stewart relies.'8 If "established" does not mean established at the time
of the First Amendment, what does it mean? How would Justice
Stewart feel about CNBC or MSNBC, the upstart and self-styled anti-
establishment TV stations so important in pursuing the Lewinsky
perjury matter? And even if one were to stretch "established" to
include them, what of Matt Drudge, and his internet-based "Drudge
Report"-the real moving force behind public mobilization in
Monicagate? Surely the internet is not "established news media"-or is
12. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 455, 534
(1983).
13. Stewart, supra note 1, at 633.
14. It bears noting here that the "other" Speech clause of the Constitution, Article I,
section 6's admonition that members of Congress not be "questioned" outside Congress for
"any Speech or Debate in either House," is clearly structural in character-safeguarding open
and robust debate by Congresspersons free from fear of viewpoint-based reprisal or censor.
15. "That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and publishing
their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained." Pa.
Declaration of Rights art. XII (1776), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHwARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 266 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 781-83 & nn.6-7 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing First Amendment difficulties lurking in any attempt to define media).
17. Stewart, supra note 1, at 631.
18. Id at 633 (discussing access to channels of radio or television).
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it? First Amendment jurisprudence frowns on laws whose vagueness
creates substantial uncertainty about whose expressive conduct will be
protected and whose will not. I don't think we ought to interpret the
First Amendment itself so as to raise the ultimate vagueness issue.19
19. None of this means, of course, that in any particular case the institutional-press
identity of an actor may not be relevant. For example, consider Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct.
1692 (1999)(holding that media ridealongs violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
notwithstanding First Amendment protection of the Press). To the extent that ride-alongs are
justified by the education and information about police conduct that such ride-alongs provide,
perhaps one could argue that including CNN in a ride-along may be more "reasonable"-
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment's ban on "unreasonable searches"-than
including Vik Amar, who can inform and educate a much smaller slice of the public. Or
conversely, perhaps one can argue that taking CNN along makes the search more
"unreasonable" because the privacy of the person being searched is compromised much more
than it would be by taking along Vik Amar. Either way, the identity, mission and audience of
CNN may become relevant to the constitutional analysis, but this does not create the kind of
sharp dichotomy of First Amendment rights Justice Stewart advocates.
April 1999]

